Doing the Best We Can [electronic resource] : An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic /
Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with only some trivial assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B).
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Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands,
1986
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Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4570-8 |
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KOHA-OAI-TEST:1846392018-07-30T23:06:23ZDoing the Best We Can [electronic resource] : An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic / Feldman, Fred. author. SpringerLink (Online service) textDordrecht : Springer Netherlands,1986.engSeveral years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with only some trivial assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B).One/Absolute Moral Obligation -- 1. Utilitarian Foundations -- 2. A Theory of Moral Obligation -- 3. Moral Objections to MO -- Two/Iffy Oughts -- 4. Basic Iffy Oughts -- 5 Hypothetical Imperatives -- 6. Defeasible Commitment and Prima Facie Obligation -- Three/Extensions -- 7. Individual Obligation and Group Welfare -- 8. What Ought to be -- 9. Conflicts of Obligation -- 10. Conclusions -- Notes -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with only some trivial assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B).Philosophy.Ethics.Philosophy.Ethics.Springer eBookshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4570-8URN:ISBN:9789400945708 |
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Philosophy. Ethics. Philosophy. Ethics. Philosophy. Ethics. Philosophy. Ethics. Feldman, Fred. author. SpringerLink (Online service) Doing the Best We Can [electronic resource] : An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic / |
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Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with only some trivial assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B). |
format |
Texto |
topic_facet |
Philosophy. Ethics. Philosophy. Ethics. |
author |
Feldman, Fred. author. SpringerLink (Online service) |
author_facet |
Feldman, Fred. author. SpringerLink (Online service) |
author_sort |
Feldman, Fred. author. |
title |
Doing the Best We Can [electronic resource] : An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic / |
title_short |
Doing the Best We Can [electronic resource] : An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic / |
title_full |
Doing the Best We Can [electronic resource] : An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic / |
title_fullStr |
Doing the Best We Can [electronic resource] : An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic / |
title_full_unstemmed |
Doing the Best We Can [electronic resource] : An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic / |
title_sort |
doing the best we can [electronic resource] : an essay in informal deontic logic / |
publisher |
Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, |
publishDate |
1986 |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4570-8 |
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