Bonus Options in Health Insurance [electronic resource] /

Bonus Options in Health Insurance [electronic resource] /

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Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus? On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Zweifel, Peter. author., SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: Texto biblioteca
Language:eng
Published: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 1992
Subjects:Finance., Industrial organization., Economic policy., Finance, general., Economic Policy., Industrial Organization.,
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2530-7
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spelling KOHA-OAI-TEST:1699572018-07-30T22:46:18ZBonus Options in Health Insurance [electronic resource] / Zweifel, Peter. author. SpringerLink (Online service) textDordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer,1992.engConfronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus? On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.1. Overview and key statements of the study -- 2. Institutional framework, issues, and results -- 3. Health insurance options from the point of view of the consumer -- 4. Insurer A: Traditional cost sharing -- 5. Insurer B: Fixed rebates for no claims -- 6. Self-selection of risks with insurers A and B? -- 7. Insurer C: The dynamic bonus system -- 8. First-dollar coverage, fixed rebate, and dynamic bonus compared -- 9. Bonus options in social health insurance? -- Appendix A. Tables -- A. 1. Characterization of data base -- A.2. Dependent variables and means (1982), insurer A -- A.3. Explanatory variables and means (1982), insurer A -- A.4. Dependent variables and means (1982), insurer B -- A.5. Explanatory variables and means (1982), insurer B -- A.6. Dependent variables, merged sample -- A.7. Explanatory variables and means, subsamples and merged sample -- Appendix B. Sample construction and choice of statistical method -- B.1. Overview of plans written by insurers A, B, and C -- B.2. Representativeness and comparability of samples -- B.3. Methodological issues in empirical analysis -- B.3.1. Neutralizing the decision to submit -- B.3.2. Choice of statistical method -- B.3.3. Description of explanatory variables -- References -- Index of names -- Index of subjects.Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus? On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.Finance.Industrial organization.Economic policy.Finance.Finance, general.Economic Policy.Industrial Organization.Springer eBookshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2530-7URN:ISBN:9789401125307
institution COLPOS
collection Koha
country México
countrycode MX
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
En linea
databasecode cat-colpos
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Departamento de documentación y biblioteca de COLPOS
language eng
topic Finance.
Industrial organization.
Economic policy.
Finance.
Finance, general.
Economic Policy.
Industrial Organization.
Finance.
Industrial organization.
Economic policy.
Finance.
Finance, general.
Economic Policy.
Industrial Organization.
spellingShingle Finance.
Industrial organization.
Economic policy.
Finance.
Finance, general.
Economic Policy.
Industrial Organization.
Finance.
Industrial organization.
Economic policy.
Finance.
Finance, general.
Economic Policy.
Industrial Organization.
Zweifel, Peter. author.
SpringerLink (Online service)
Bonus Options in Health Insurance [electronic resource] /
description Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus? On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.
format Texto
topic_facet Finance.
Industrial organization.
Economic policy.
Finance.
Finance, general.
Economic Policy.
Industrial Organization.
author Zweifel, Peter. author.
SpringerLink (Online service)
author_facet Zweifel, Peter. author.
SpringerLink (Online service)
author_sort Zweifel, Peter. author.
title Bonus Options in Health Insurance [electronic resource] /
title_short Bonus Options in Health Insurance [electronic resource] /
title_full Bonus Options in Health Insurance [electronic resource] /
title_fullStr Bonus Options in Health Insurance [electronic resource] /
title_full_unstemmed Bonus Options in Health Insurance [electronic resource] /
title_sort bonus options in health insurance [electronic resource] /
publisher Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer,
publishDate 1992
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2530-7
work_keys_str_mv AT zweifelpeterauthor bonusoptionsinhealthinsuranceelectronicresource
AT springerlinkonlineservice bonusoptionsinhealthinsuranceelectronicresource
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