Merleau-Ponty against the project of a universal gramar : logic and language

Abstract: Throughout a variety of texts, Merleau-Ponty criticized the Husserlian project which he alternatively called a “universal grammar” and an “eidetics of language”, and to which he associated a series of consequences: the claim that universal grammar entails (I) the prior knowability of universal “forms” with respect to natural languages; (II) the univocity with which words in natural languages would be related to their meanings, and the transparency which this univocal relation would present to consciousness; (III) the secondariness of language with respect to thought, and (IV) universal intertranslatability. The French author rejects these consequences and therefore questions the plausibility of the universalistic project in question. However, it is not clear that these alleged consequences are actually entailed by the proposal Merleau-Ponty is discussing, or that, if obtained, they take the specific form necessary for the criticism to succeed. We will try to show that such a criticism ultimately fails.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Cormick, Claudio Javier
Format: Artículo biblioteca
Language:eng
Published: Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Centro de Estudiantes de Filosofía 2024
Subjects:Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908-1961, GRAMATICA, LENGUAJE, LOGICA,
Online Access:https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/18470
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Summary:Abstract: Throughout a variety of texts, Merleau-Ponty criticized the Husserlian project which he alternatively called a “universal grammar” and an “eidetics of language”, and to which he associated a series of consequences: the claim that universal grammar entails (I) the prior knowability of universal “forms” with respect to natural languages; (II) the univocity with which words in natural languages would be related to their meanings, and the transparency which this univocal relation would present to consciousness; (III) the secondariness of language with respect to thought, and (IV) universal intertranslatability. The French author rejects these consequences and therefore questions the plausibility of the universalistic project in question. However, it is not clear that these alleged consequences are actually entailed by the proposal Merleau-Ponty is discussing, or that, if obtained, they take the specific form necessary for the criticism to succeed. We will try to show that such a criticism ultimately fails.