Rebel Governance and Development : The Persistent Effects of Guerrillas in El Salvador
How does territorial control by non-state actors affect long-term development This paper investigates the economic, social, and political consequences of temporary territorial control by guerrillas during the Salvadoran Civil War. During this period, the guerrillas displaced state authorities and promoted the creation of self-governing institutions that were highly representative of local values and openly distrusted the state and elites. Using a spatial regression discontinuity design, the paper shows that areas once under guerrilla control have experienced worse economic outcomes about 30 years after the guerrillas first controlled them, relative to adjacent areas that were then controlled by the formal state. The results suggest that informal community institutions in guerrilla-controlled areas led to enduring land fragmentation and disengagement with the government. The paper argues that when non-state actors develop governance institutions as an alternative to the state, this can lead to negative development effects through lasting norms of distrust of out-groups.
Main Authors: | , , , , |
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Format: | Working Paper biblioteca |
Language: | English English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2022-11
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Subjects: | ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, VIOLENCE, FORCED CHILD RECRUITMENT, CHILD SOLDIER, INTERNAL MIGRATION, RELOCATION AND CONFLICT, GUERRILLA VIOLENCE, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099535511042231945/IDU0b330011c0b62704de8087f108ff79e014715 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/38276 |
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Summary: | How does territorial control by
non-state actors affect long-term development This paper
investigates the economic, social, and political
consequences of temporary territorial control by guerrillas
during the Salvadoran Civil War. During this period, the
guerrillas displaced state authorities and promoted the
creation of self-governing institutions that were highly
representative of local values and openly distrusted the
state and elites. Using a spatial regression discontinuity
design, the paper shows that areas once under guerrilla
control have experienced worse economic outcomes about 30
years after the guerrillas first controlled them, relative
to adjacent areas that were then controlled by the formal
state. The results suggest that informal community
institutions in guerrilla-controlled areas led to enduring
land fragmentation and disengagement with the government.
The paper argues that when non-state actors develop
governance institutions as an alternative to the state, this
can lead to negative development effects through lasting
norms of distrust of out-groups. |
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