Macro Crises and Targeting Transfers to the Poor
A central question for policy makers concerned with helping the poor through a macro crisis is how to target scarcer resources at a time of greater need. Technical arguments suggest that finer targeting through tightening individual programs or reallocation resources towards more tightly targeted programs uses resources more efficiently for poverty reduction. These arguments survive even when the greater informational costs and the incentive effects of finer targeting are taken into account. But political economy arguments suggest that finer targeting will end up with fewer resources allocated to that program, and that looser targeting, because it knits together the interests of the poor and the near poor, may generate greater resources and hence be more effective for poverty reduction despite being 'leakier.' Overall the policy advice to tighten targeting and to avoid more loosely targeted programs during crises needs to be given with consideration caution. However, the advice to design transfer systems with greater flexibility, in the technical and the political economy senses, is strengthened by the arguments presented here. The case for external assistance to design flexible transfer systems ex ante and to relieve the painful tradeoffs in targeting during a crisis is also shown to be strong.
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dig-okr-10986277862024-08-08T15:50:09Z Macro Crises and Targeting Transfers to the Poor Kanbur, Ravi ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AVERAGE INCOMES BASIC NEEDS CASH TRANSFERS CLIMATE CHANGE COMMODITY GROUPS CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING COUNTRY CASE DECOMPOSABLE POVERTY MEASURES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS DEVELOPMENT REPORT DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC STUDIES ECONOMICS FINANCIAL CRISIS FLEXIBILITY FOOD SUBSIDIES HEADCOUNT RATIO HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS INCENTIVE COSTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOMES INCREASE INCREASE POVERTY INDICATOR TARGETING INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY FALLS INSURANCE INTERVENTIONS LONG RUN MARGINAL TAX MARGINAL TAX RATE MARGINAL TAX RATES MEANS TESTING NUTRITION OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION PERFECT TARGETING POLICY CHANGES POLICY MAKERS POLICY OPTIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR COUNTRIES POOR PERSON POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS POVERTY GAP POVERTY IMPACT POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINE POVERTY MEASURES POVERTY MINIMIZATION POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRO POOR PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC WORKS REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RICH COUNTRIES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT RURAL HOUSEHOLDS SAFETY NETS SELF TARGETING SOCIAL PROTECTION SQUARED POVERTY GAP TARGETING TAXATION TRANSFER PROGRAMS WAGES WELL BEING A central question for policy makers concerned with helping the poor through a macro crisis is how to target scarcer resources at a time of greater need. Technical arguments suggest that finer targeting through tightening individual programs or reallocation resources towards more tightly targeted programs uses resources more efficiently for poverty reduction. These arguments survive even when the greater informational costs and the incentive effects of finer targeting are taken into account. But political economy arguments suggest that finer targeting will end up with fewer resources allocated to that program, and that looser targeting, because it knits together the interests of the poor and the near poor, may generate greater resources and hence be more effective for poverty reduction despite being 'leakier.' Overall the policy advice to tighten targeting and to avoid more loosely targeted programs during crises needs to be given with consideration caution. However, the advice to design transfer systems with greater flexibility, in the technical and the political economy senses, is strengthened by the arguments presented here. The case for external assistance to design flexible transfer systems ex ante and to relieve the painful tradeoffs in targeting during a crisis is also shown to be strong. 2017-08-14T20:46:10Z 2017-08-14T20:46:10Z 2010 Working Paper Document de travail Documento de trabajo http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/504701468325185635/Macro-crises-and-targeting-transfers-to-the-poor https://hdl.handle.net/10986/27786 English en_US Commission on Growth and Development Working Paper;No. 66 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
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Banco Mundial |
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Estados Unidos |
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US |
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Bibliográfico |
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Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AVERAGE INCOMES BASIC NEEDS CASH TRANSFERS CLIMATE CHANGE COMMODITY GROUPS CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING COUNTRY CASE DECOMPOSABLE POVERTY MEASURES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS DEVELOPMENT REPORT DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC STUDIES ECONOMICS FINANCIAL CRISIS FLEXIBILITY FOOD SUBSIDIES HEADCOUNT RATIO HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS INCENTIVE COSTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOMES INCREASE INCREASE POVERTY INDICATOR TARGETING INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY FALLS INSURANCE INTERVENTIONS LONG RUN MARGINAL TAX MARGINAL TAX RATE MARGINAL TAX RATES MEANS TESTING NUTRITION OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION PERFECT TARGETING POLICY CHANGES POLICY MAKERS POLICY OPTIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR COUNTRIES POOR PERSON POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS POVERTY GAP POVERTY IMPACT POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINE POVERTY MEASURES POVERTY MINIMIZATION POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRO POOR PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC WORKS REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RICH COUNTRIES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT RURAL HOUSEHOLDS SAFETY NETS SELF TARGETING SOCIAL PROTECTION SQUARED POVERTY GAP TARGETING TAXATION TRANSFER PROGRAMS WAGES WELL BEING ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AVERAGE INCOMES BASIC NEEDS CASH TRANSFERS CLIMATE CHANGE COMMODITY GROUPS CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING COUNTRY CASE DECOMPOSABLE POVERTY MEASURES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS DEVELOPMENT REPORT DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC STUDIES ECONOMICS FINANCIAL CRISIS FLEXIBILITY FOOD SUBSIDIES HEADCOUNT RATIO HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS INCENTIVE COSTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOMES INCREASE INCREASE POVERTY INDICATOR TARGETING INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY FALLS INSURANCE INTERVENTIONS LONG RUN MARGINAL TAX MARGINAL TAX RATE MARGINAL TAX RATES MEANS TESTING NUTRITION OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION PERFECT TARGETING POLICY CHANGES POLICY MAKERS POLICY OPTIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR COUNTRIES POOR PERSON POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS POVERTY GAP POVERTY IMPACT POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINE POVERTY MEASURES POVERTY MINIMIZATION POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRO POOR PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC WORKS REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RICH COUNTRIES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT RURAL HOUSEHOLDS SAFETY NETS SELF TARGETING SOCIAL PROTECTION SQUARED POVERTY GAP TARGETING TAXATION TRANSFER PROGRAMS WAGES WELL BEING |
| spellingShingle |
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AVERAGE INCOMES BASIC NEEDS CASH TRANSFERS CLIMATE CHANGE COMMODITY GROUPS CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING COUNTRY CASE DECOMPOSABLE POVERTY MEASURES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS DEVELOPMENT REPORT DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC STUDIES ECONOMICS FINANCIAL CRISIS FLEXIBILITY FOOD SUBSIDIES HEADCOUNT RATIO HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS INCENTIVE COSTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOMES INCREASE INCREASE POVERTY INDICATOR TARGETING INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY FALLS INSURANCE INTERVENTIONS LONG RUN MARGINAL TAX MARGINAL TAX RATE MARGINAL TAX RATES MEANS TESTING NUTRITION OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION PERFECT TARGETING POLICY CHANGES POLICY MAKERS POLICY OPTIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR COUNTRIES POOR PERSON POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS POVERTY GAP POVERTY IMPACT POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINE POVERTY MEASURES POVERTY MINIMIZATION POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRO POOR PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC WORKS REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RICH COUNTRIES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT RURAL HOUSEHOLDS SAFETY NETS SELF TARGETING SOCIAL PROTECTION SQUARED POVERTY GAP TARGETING TAXATION TRANSFER PROGRAMS WAGES WELL BEING ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AVERAGE INCOMES BASIC NEEDS CASH TRANSFERS CLIMATE CHANGE COMMODITY GROUPS CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING COUNTRY CASE DECOMPOSABLE POVERTY MEASURES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS DEVELOPMENT REPORT DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC STUDIES ECONOMICS FINANCIAL CRISIS FLEXIBILITY FOOD SUBSIDIES HEADCOUNT RATIO HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS INCENTIVE COSTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOMES INCREASE INCREASE POVERTY INDICATOR TARGETING INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY FALLS INSURANCE INTERVENTIONS LONG RUN MARGINAL TAX MARGINAL TAX RATE MARGINAL TAX RATES MEANS TESTING NUTRITION OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION PERFECT TARGETING POLICY CHANGES POLICY MAKERS POLICY OPTIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR COUNTRIES POOR PERSON POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS POVERTY GAP POVERTY IMPACT POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINE POVERTY MEASURES POVERTY MINIMIZATION POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRO POOR PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC WORKS REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RICH COUNTRIES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT RURAL HOUSEHOLDS SAFETY NETS SELF TARGETING SOCIAL PROTECTION SQUARED POVERTY GAP TARGETING TAXATION TRANSFER PROGRAMS WAGES WELL BEING Kanbur, Ravi Macro Crises and Targeting Transfers to the Poor |
| description |
A central question for policy makers
concerned with helping the poor through a macro crisis is
how to target scarcer resources at a time of greater need.
Technical arguments suggest that finer targeting through
tightening individual programs or reallocation resources
towards more tightly targeted programs uses resources more
efficiently for poverty reduction. These arguments survive
even when the greater informational costs and the incentive
effects of finer targeting are taken into account. But
political economy arguments suggest that finer targeting
will end up with fewer resources allocated to that program,
and that looser targeting, because it knits together the
interests of the poor and the near poor, may generate
greater resources and hence be more effective for poverty
reduction despite being 'leakier.' Overall the
policy advice to tighten targeting and to avoid more loosely
targeted programs during crises needs to be given with
consideration caution. However, the advice to design
transfer systems with greater flexibility, in the technical
and the political economy senses, is strengthened by the
arguments presented here. The case for external assistance
to design flexible transfer systems ex ante and to relieve
the painful tradeoffs in targeting during a crisis is also
shown to be strong. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| topic_facet |
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AVERAGE INCOMES BASIC NEEDS CASH TRANSFERS CLIMATE CHANGE COMMODITY GROUPS CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING COUNTRY CASE DECOMPOSABLE POVERTY MEASURES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS DEVELOPMENT REPORT DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC STUDIES ECONOMICS FINANCIAL CRISIS FLEXIBILITY FOOD SUBSIDIES HEADCOUNT RATIO HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS INCENTIVE COSTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOMES INCREASE INCREASE POVERTY INDICATOR TARGETING INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY FALLS INSURANCE INTERVENTIONS LONG RUN MARGINAL TAX MARGINAL TAX RATE MARGINAL TAX RATES MEANS TESTING NUTRITION OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION PERFECT TARGETING POLICY CHANGES POLICY MAKERS POLICY OPTIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POOR COUNTRIES POOR PERSON POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS POVERTY GAP POVERTY IMPACT POVERTY INCIDENCE POVERTY LINE POVERTY MEASURES POVERTY MINIMIZATION POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRO POOR PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC WORKS REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RICH COUNTRIES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT RURAL HOUSEHOLDS SAFETY NETS SELF TARGETING SOCIAL PROTECTION SQUARED POVERTY GAP TARGETING TAXATION TRANSFER PROGRAMS WAGES WELL BEING |
| author |
Kanbur, Ravi |
| author_facet |
Kanbur, Ravi |
| author_sort |
Kanbur, Ravi |
| title |
Macro Crises and Targeting Transfers to the Poor |
| title_short |
Macro Crises and Targeting Transfers to the Poor |
| title_full |
Macro Crises and Targeting Transfers to the Poor |
| title_fullStr |
Macro Crises and Targeting Transfers to the Poor |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Macro Crises and Targeting Transfers to the Poor |
| title_sort |
macro crises and targeting transfers to the poor |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2010 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/504701468325185635/Macro-crises-and-targeting-transfers-to-the-poor https://hdl.handle.net/10986/27786 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT kanburravi macrocrisesandtargetingtransferstothepoor |
| _version_ |
1807156274699173888 |