Banking Supervisors and External Auditors
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted weaknesses in the risk management, control and governance processes of banks as well as in their statutory audit and financial supervision. This led to increased scrutiny of the respective roles and interactions of banking supervisors and external auditors who are key contributors to market discipline. Auditors ensure that financial information is transparent and reliable while supervisors provide confidence in the financial systems. Both supervisors and auditors allow market players to make informed decisions and contribute to financial stability. Since 2008, regulators and lawmakers have strived to address the shortcomings identified during the crisis by taking various initiatives to reform the international financial architecture In particular, a 2014 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision paper explored the interaction between supervisors and external auditors and linked their enhanced relationships with improved audit quality of banks’ financial statements and effective banking supervision. This report presents the findings of the survey conducted by the World Bank Centre for Financial Reporting Reform (CFRR) – Financial supervisors and external auditors: building a constructive relationship. The survey was sent to supervisors from the European Union and other countries in Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus to explore practices that make better use of information provided by external auditors and influence the audit quality of banks’ financial statements. The report was developed after several workshop discussions amongst senior staff from central banks and banking regulatory agencies, who recognized the importance of an effective relationship to assist both supervisors and auditors in discharging their duties.
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper biblioteca |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Vienna
2015
|
| Subjects: | external audits, bank supervision, communication, financial supervision, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/08/26709796/banking-supervisors-external-auditors-building-constructive-relationship-supervisors-insights https://hdl.handle.net/10986/25074 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | The 2008 financial crisis highlighted
weaknesses in the risk management, control and governance
processes of banks as well as in their statutory audit and
financial supervision. This led to increased scrutiny of the
respective roles and interactions of banking supervisors and
external auditors who are key contributors to market
discipline. Auditors ensure that financial information is
transparent and reliable while supervisors provide
confidence in the financial systems. Both supervisors and
auditors allow market players to make informed decisions and
contribute to financial stability. Since 2008, regulators
and lawmakers have strived to address the shortcomings
identified during the crisis by taking various initiatives
to reform the international financial architecture In
particular, a 2014 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
paper explored the interaction between supervisors and
external auditors and linked their enhanced relationships
with improved audit quality of banks’ financial statements
and effective banking supervision. This report presents the
findings of the survey conducted by the World Bank Centre
for Financial Reporting Reform (CFRR) – Financial
supervisors and external auditors: building a constructive
relationship. The survey was sent to supervisors from the
European Union and other countries in Eastern Europe, South
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus to explore practices
that make better use of information provided by external
auditors and influence the audit quality of banks’ financial
statements. The report was developed after several workshop
discussions amongst senior staff from central banks and
banking regulatory agencies, who recognized the importance
of an effective relationship to assist both supervisors and
auditors in discharging their duties. |
|---|