Reducing Structural Dominance and Entry Barriers in Russian Industry

Many industrial firms in Russia have undergone changes in ownership, but relatively few have been competitively restructured. Using survey and other data, the author suggests that much of Russian industry is immune from robust competition because of heavy vertical integration, geographic segmentation, and the concentration of buyers and sellers, in selected markets. Moreover, regulatory constraints protect incumbent firms from competition with new entrants, both domestic and foreign. The author sketches a reform agenda for Russia's post-privatization program, which emphasizes the restructuring of anti-competitive structures and the reduction of barriers to entry. The author's proposed reform agenda calls broadly for strengthening Russia's nascent rules-based framework for competition policy to reduce discretion, increase transparency, and improve accountability.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Broadman, Harry G.
Language:en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2000-05
Subjects:industrialization, enterprise restructuring, competition (economic), trade barriers, integration, market demand, market competitive advantage, regulatory framework, reform implementation, privatization criteria, anti-competitive practices, bank loans, barriers to entry, branches, budget constraints, business development, business environment, central planning, coal, collusion, company, competition law, competition policy, competitors, consumers, corporate control, corporate governance, debt, dominant firm, downsizing, economic barriers, economic power, economies of scale, economists, empirical analysis, empirical evidence, empirical studies, employment, enterprise reform, entrepreneurs, Entrepreneurship, expansion, financial institutions, firm size, firms, foreign direct investment, GDP, Horizontal integration, imports, income, industrial enterprises, investment expenditures, labor force, leasing, legislation, licensing, local authorities, manufacturing enterprises, market economies, market power, medium size enterprises, mergers, monopolies, monopoly, natural resources, oil, open economies, personal savings, policy makers, political economy, positive externalities, predatory pricing, price controls, price fixing, private property, producers, product differentiation, product markets, productivity, profit margins, property rights, refrigeration, savings, small business, small businesses, small enterprises, small firms, SME, SME development, SME managers, SME sector, state owned enterprises, sunk costs, suppliers, tax concessions, tax rates, technical assistance, transactions costs, transition economies, vertical concentration,
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/21604
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Summary:Many industrial firms in Russia have undergone changes in ownership, but relatively few have been competitively restructured. Using survey and other data, the author suggests that much of Russian industry is immune from robust competition because of heavy vertical integration, geographic segmentation, and the concentration of buyers and sellers, in selected markets. Moreover, regulatory constraints protect incumbent firms from competition with new entrants, both domestic and foreign. The author sketches a reform agenda for Russia's post-privatization program, which emphasizes the restructuring of anti-competitive structures and the reduction of barriers to entry. The author's proposed reform agenda calls broadly for strengthening Russia's nascent rules-based framework for competition policy to reduce discretion, increase transparency, and improve accountability.