Living and Dying with Hard Pegs : The Rise and Fall of Argentina's Currency Board

The rise and fall of Argentina's currency board shows the extent to which the advantages of hard pegs have been overstated. The currency board did provide nominal stability and boosted financial intermediation, at the cost of endogenous financial dollarization, but did not foster monetary or fiscal discipline. The failure to adequately address the currency-growth-debt trap into which Argentina fell at the end of the 1990s precipitated a run on the currency and the banks, followed by the abandonment of the currency board and a sovereign debt default. The crisis can be best interpreted as a bad outcome of a high-stakes strategy to overcome a weak currency problem. To increase the credibility of the hard peg, the government raised its exit costs, which deepened the crisis once exit could no longer be avoided. But some alternative exit strategies would have been less destructive than the one adopted.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Levy Yeyati, Eduardo, De la Torre, Augusto, Schmukler, Sergio L.
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2003-03
Subjects:AFFILIATES, AGGREGATE DEMAND, ARGENTINE PESO, ASSET SUBSTITUTION, BAD LOANS, BALANCE SHEET, BALANCE SHEETS, BANK ACCOUNTS, BANK ASSETS, BANK DEPOSITS, BANK FAILURES, BANK REGULATION, BANK RISK, BANK RUN, BANKING CRISIS, BANKING SECTOR, BANKING SYSTEM, BANKRUPTCY, BANKS, BENCHMARK, BRAZILIAN REAL, CAPITAL FLOWS, CAPITAL INFLOWS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, CENTRAL BANK, CENTRAL BANK AS LENDER, CLOSED ECONOMY, CONSOLIDATION, CONTAGION, CONVERTIBILITY, COST OF CAPITAL, COUNTRY RISK, CREDIT RISK, CREDITOR, CREDITOR RIGHTS, CURRENCY, CURRENCY BOARD, CURRENCY BOARDS, CURRENCY CRISIS, CURRENCY MISMATCH, CURRENCY OF DENOMINATION, CURRENCY RISK, CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION, CURRENT ACCOUNT, DEBT, DEBT SERVICE, DEFAULT RISK, DEMAND DEPOSITS, DEREGULATION, DEVALUATION, DOLLAR DEPOSITS, DOMESTIC CURRENCY, DOMESTIC MARKETS, EMERGING ECONOMIES, EURO, EXCHANGE RATE, EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTMENTS, EXCHANGE RATE FLEXIBILITY, EXCHANGE RATE REGIME, EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES, EXCHANGE RATE RISK, EXPORTS, EXTERNAL DEBT, EXTERNAL SHOCKS, FINANCIAL ASSETS, FINANCIAL CONTRACTS, FINANCIAL CRISIS, FINANCIAL DEEPENING, FINANCIAL INSTABILITY, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, FINANCIAL MARKETS, FINANCIAL SECTOR, FINANCIAL SYSTEM, FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, FISCAL SPENDING, FISCAL SURPLUS, FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY, FLOATING MONEY, FOREIGN BANKS, FOREIGN CURRENCY, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK, GDP, GOVERNMENT BONDS, GOVERNMENT DEBT, INCOME, INDIVIDUAL BANK, INFLATION, INTEREST RATE, INTEREST RATES, INTERMEDIATION, INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY, INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, LABOR MARKETS, LENDER OF LAST RESORT, LIQUIDITY, LOAN CLASSIFICATION, LOAN PORTFOLIO, MACROECONOMICS, MARGINAL COST, MATURITIES, MORTGAGE LOANS, MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA, NOMINAL DEVALUATION, NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE, NOMINAL FLEXIBILITY, OPEN ECONOMIES, OVERVALUATION, PEGS, PESOS, PRIVATE BANKS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC DEBT, RATING AGENCIES, REAL EXCHANGE RATE, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, RESERVE REQUIREMENTS, REVALUATION, SAVINGS, SAVINGS DEPOSITS, SOLVENCY, STORE OF VALUE, TAX REFORM, TIME DEPOSITS, TRANSPARENCY, TREASURY, TREASURY BONDS, UNEMPLOYMENT, WAGES CURRENCY BOARDS, MONETARY LAW, MONETARY POLICY POLITICAL ASPECTS, CURRENCY DEVALUATION, CURRENCY FLUCTUATION, CURRENCY ISSUANCE, CURRENCY REPEGS, EXCHANGE RATE INSTABILITY, DOLLAR STANDARD, FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES, CURRENCY MARKETS, DEPOSIT-REFUND SYSTEM, PESO ARGENTINO, BANKING REFORM, WAGES,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/03/2166846/living-dying-hard-pegs-rise-fall-argentinas-currency-board
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19040
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Summary:The rise and fall of Argentina's currency board shows the extent to which the advantages of hard pegs have been overstated. The currency board did provide nominal stability and boosted financial intermediation, at the cost of endogenous financial dollarization, but did not foster monetary or fiscal discipline. The failure to adequately address the currency-growth-debt trap into which Argentina fell at the end of the 1990s precipitated a run on the currency and the banks, followed by the abandonment of the currency board and a sovereign debt default. The crisis can be best interpreted as a bad outcome of a high-stakes strategy to overcome a weak currency problem. To increase the credibility of the hard peg, the government raised its exit costs, which deepened the crisis once exit could no longer be avoided. But some alternative exit strategies would have been less destructive than the one adopted.