Cash Transfers, Conditions, School Enrollment, and Child Work : Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Ecuador
The impact of cash transfer programs on the accumulation of human capital is a topic of great policy importance. An attendant question is whether program effects are larger when transfers are "conditioned" on certain behaviors, such as a requirement that households enroll their children in school. This paper uses a randomized study design to analyze the impact of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), a cash transfer program, on enrollment and child work among poor children in Ecuador. There are two main results. First, the BDH program had a large, positive impact on school enrollment, about 10 percentage points, and a large, negative impact on child work, about 17 percentage points. Second, the fact that some households believed that there was a school enrollment requirement attached to the transfers, even though such a requirement was never enforced or monitored in Ecuador, helps explain the magnitude of program effects.
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2006-06
|
| Subjects: | CAPITA CONSUMPTION, CAPITA EXPENDITURE, CHILD LABOR, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES, ENROLLMENT, ENROLLMENT FOR CHILDREN, ENROLLMENT RATE, ENROLLMENT RATES, GENDER DISPARITY, GIRLS, HIGHER ENROLLMENT, HOUSEHOLD SIZE, HOUSEHOLD SURVEY, HOUSEHOLDS, HOUSING, LATIN AMERICAN, NET ENROLLMENT, POINTS, POOR HOUSEHOLDS, POPULATION CENSUS, POVERTY LINE, PRIMARY ENROLLMENT, PRIMARY ENROLLMENT RATE, PRIMARY SCHOOL, RURAL AREAS, SCHOOLING, SIMULATIONS, STANDARD DEVIATION, STANDARD ERROR, STANDARD ERRORS, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/6822650/cash-transfers-conditions-school-enrollment-child-work-evidence-randomized-experiment-ecuador https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8452 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|