Entry Regulation and Business Start-ups : Evidence from Mexico
The authors estimate the effect on business start-ups of a program that significantly speeds up firm registration procedures. The program was implemented in Mexico in different municipalities at different dates. Authors estimates suggest that new start-ups increased by about 4 percent in eligible industries, and the authors present evidence that this is a causal effect. Most of the effect is temporary, concentrated in the first 10 months after implementation. The effect is robust to several specifications of the benchmark control group time trends. The authors find that the program was more effective in municipalities with less corruption and cheaper additional procedures.
Main Authors: | , , |
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Language: | English |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2007-06
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Subjects: | BANKRUPTCY LAWS, CITIES, COMPANY, CONSUMERS, EMPLOYMENT, ENTREPRENEUR, ENTREPRENEURS, EQUALITY, ESTATE, FIRM SIZE, FIRMS, GOVERNMENT REGULATION, GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS, HOUSING, INDIVIDUALS, INFORMAL SECTOR, JOB CREATION, LAW FIRMS, LIMITED, LIMITED LIABILITY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, MAYORS, MUNICIPAL LEVEL, MUNICIPALITIES, MUNICIPALITY, PER CAPITA INCOME, POLITICAL PARTY, PROPRIETARY, PROXY, PUBLIC TRANSPORT, REGULATORY BURDEN, SHOP, SMALL FIRM, SMALL FIRMS, STATE GOVERNMENTS, STORES, TAX COLLECTION, UNION, URBAN AREAS, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/08/8099176/entry-regulation-business-start-ups-evidence-mexico-entry-regulation-business-start-ups-evidence-mexico https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7311 |
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Summary: | The authors estimate the effect on
business start-ups of a program that significantly speeds up
firm registration procedures. The program was implemented in
Mexico in different municipalities at different dates.
Authors estimates suggest that new start-ups increased by
about 4 percent in eligible industries, and the authors
present evidence that this is a causal effect. Most of the
effect is temporary, concentrated in the first 10 months
after implementation. The effect is robust to several
specifications of the benchmark control group time trends.
The authors find that the program was more effective in
municipalities with less corruption and cheaper additional procedures. |
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