Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies
The inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society—a previously unexplored determinant of civil war—causes both elected and unelected governments to pursue public policies that leave citizens worse off and more prone to revolt. Noncredible political actors are also less able to build counterinsurgency capacity. Popular dissatisfaction with rulers reduces the costs to counterinsurgents of overthrowing regimes, discouraging rulers from building counterinsurgency capacity in the first place; lack of credibility prevents rulers from writing contracts with counterinsurgents that maximize counterinsurgency effort. Empirical tests across numerous subsamples using various measures of political credibility support the conclusion that broad political credibility ranks at least as high as social fractionalization and natural resource rents as a cause of conflict.
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Format: | Journal Article biblioteca |
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World Bank
2008-01-30
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Subjects: | armed conflict, civil war, conflict, counterinsurgency, International Bank, Peace, Peace Research, rebel, Reconstruction, violent conflict, |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4471 |
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dig-okr-1098644712021-04-23T14:02:18Z Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies Keefer, Philip armed conflict civil war conflict counterinsurgency International Bank Peace Peace Research rebel Reconstruction violent conflict The inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society—a previously unexplored determinant of civil war—causes both elected and unelected governments to pursue public policies that leave citizens worse off and more prone to revolt. Noncredible political actors are also less able to build counterinsurgency capacity. Popular dissatisfaction with rulers reduces the costs to counterinsurgents of overthrowing regimes, discouraging rulers from building counterinsurgency capacity in the first place; lack of credibility prevents rulers from writing contracts with counterinsurgents that maximize counterinsurgency effort. Empirical tests across numerous subsamples using various measures of political credibility support the conclusion that broad political credibility ranks at least as high as social fractionalization and natural resource rents as a cause of conflict. 2012-03-30T07:12:36Z 2012-03-30T07:12:36Z 2008-01-30 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4471 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank Journal Article Guatemala Uganda Lebanon Sri Lanka Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of North Macedonia (Formerly the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) |
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armed conflict civil war conflict counterinsurgency International Bank Peace Peace Research rebel Reconstruction violent conflict armed conflict civil war conflict counterinsurgency International Bank Peace Peace Research rebel Reconstruction violent conflict |
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armed conflict civil war conflict counterinsurgency International Bank Peace Peace Research rebel Reconstruction violent conflict armed conflict civil war conflict counterinsurgency International Bank Peace Peace Research rebel Reconstruction violent conflict Keefer, Philip Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
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The inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society—a previously unexplored determinant of civil war—causes both elected and unelected governments to pursue public policies that leave citizens worse off and more prone to revolt. Noncredible political actors are also less able to build counterinsurgency capacity. Popular dissatisfaction with rulers reduces the costs to counterinsurgents of overthrowing regimes, discouraging rulers from building counterinsurgency capacity in the first place; lack of credibility prevents rulers from writing contracts with counterinsurgents that maximize counterinsurgency effort. Empirical tests across numerous subsamples using various measures of political credibility support the conclusion that broad political credibility ranks at least as high as social fractionalization and natural resource rents as a cause of conflict. |
format |
Journal Article |
topic_facet |
armed conflict civil war conflict counterinsurgency International Bank Peace Peace Research rebel Reconstruction violent conflict |
author |
Keefer, Philip |
author_facet |
Keefer, Philip |
author_sort |
Keefer, Philip |
title |
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
title_short |
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
title_full |
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
title_fullStr |
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
title_full_unstemmed |
Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies |
title_sort |
insurgency and credible commitment in autocracies and democracies |
publisher |
World Bank |
publishDate |
2008-01-30 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4471 |
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AT keeferphilip insurgencyandcrediblecommitmentinautocraciesanddemocracies |
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1756571508625375232 |