Pension Funds and the Impact of Switching Regulation on Long-Term Investment

This paper looks at the impact of members' ability to switch pension fund provider and /or portfolio on the allocation of pension funds to long-term investments. The level of annual turnover in pension fund portfolios was compared with the amount of short-term investments (using government treasury bills and bank deposits as proxy). The investment regulations around switching and other market conduct were then considered. The paper finds that greater movements between pension fund providers and between portfolios is linked to increased holdings of short-term and more liquid assets. Switching appears to be driven by competition, market structure, and investment advice, and, unfortunately, frequently results in poor investment returns for members. The paper makes six recommends for regulators. First, use administrative controls to prevent fraudulent switching between pension providers. Second, provide clear performance and cost comparisons to inform members' choice of provider/fund and encourage informed decision making, which is beneficial for members and the system. Third, supervise and control advertising and marketing (including reporting of performance periods) carefully, to avoid switches based on misleading advice. Fourth, control financial incentives for sales agents, so that switching advice is given in members' interest and not for commercial gain. Fifth, concentrate issuance in government securities, to create more liquid instruments. And sixth, conduct further research on the concept of a central liquidity pool to manage unexpected outflows.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Pedraza Morales, Alvaro Enrique, Fuentes, Olga, Searle, Pamela, Stewart, Fiona
Format: Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2017-07
Subjects:REGULATION, PENSION FUNDS, INVESTMENT, PORTFOLIO, ACCOUNTABILITY, LIQUIDITY,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/289981499787589121/Pension-funds-and-the-impact-of-switching-regulation-on-long-term-investment
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/27646
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spelling dig-okr-10986276462024-08-09T08:42:22Z Pension Funds and the Impact of Switching Regulation on Long-Term Investment Pedraza Morales, Alvaro Enrique Fuentes, Olga Searle, Pamela Stewart, Fiona REGULATION PENSION FUNDS INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO ACCOUNTABILITY LIQUIDITY This paper looks at the impact of members' ability to switch pension fund provider and /or portfolio on the allocation of pension funds to long-term investments. The level of annual turnover in pension fund portfolios was compared with the amount of short-term investments (using government treasury bills and bank deposits as proxy). The investment regulations around switching and other market conduct were then considered. The paper finds that greater movements between pension fund providers and between portfolios is linked to increased holdings of short-term and more liquid assets. Switching appears to be driven by competition, market structure, and investment advice, and, unfortunately, frequently results in poor investment returns for members. The paper makes six recommends for regulators. First, use administrative controls to prevent fraudulent switching between pension providers. Second, provide clear performance and cost comparisons to inform members' choice of provider/fund and encourage informed decision making, which is beneficial for members and the system. Third, supervise and control advertising and marketing (including reporting of performance periods) carefully, to avoid switches based on misleading advice. Fourth, control financial incentives for sales agents, so that switching advice is given in members' interest and not for commercial gain. Fifth, concentrate issuance in government securities, to create more liquid instruments. And sixth, conduct further research on the concept of a central liquidity pool to manage unexpected outflows. 2017-07-19T18:20:51Z 2017-07-19T18:20:51Z 2017-07 Working Paper Document de travail Documento de trabajo http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/289981499787589121/Pension-funds-and-the-impact-of-switching-regulation-on-long-term-investment https://hdl.handle.net/10986/27646 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8143 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language English
en_US
topic REGULATION
PENSION FUNDS
INVESTMENT
PORTFOLIO
ACCOUNTABILITY
LIQUIDITY
REGULATION
PENSION FUNDS
INVESTMENT
PORTFOLIO
ACCOUNTABILITY
LIQUIDITY
spellingShingle REGULATION
PENSION FUNDS
INVESTMENT
PORTFOLIO
ACCOUNTABILITY
LIQUIDITY
REGULATION
PENSION FUNDS
INVESTMENT
PORTFOLIO
ACCOUNTABILITY
LIQUIDITY
Pedraza Morales, Alvaro Enrique
Fuentes, Olga
Searle, Pamela
Stewart, Fiona
Pension Funds and the Impact of Switching Regulation on Long-Term Investment
description This paper looks at the impact of members' ability to switch pension fund provider and /or portfolio on the allocation of pension funds to long-term investments. The level of annual turnover in pension fund portfolios was compared with the amount of short-term investments (using government treasury bills and bank deposits as proxy). The investment regulations around switching and other market conduct were then considered. The paper finds that greater movements between pension fund providers and between portfolios is linked to increased holdings of short-term and more liquid assets. Switching appears to be driven by competition, market structure, and investment advice, and, unfortunately, frequently results in poor investment returns for members. The paper makes six recommends for regulators. First, use administrative controls to prevent fraudulent switching between pension providers. Second, provide clear performance and cost comparisons to inform members' choice of provider/fund and encourage informed decision making, which is beneficial for members and the system. Third, supervise and control advertising and marketing (including reporting of performance periods) carefully, to avoid switches based on misleading advice. Fourth, control financial incentives for sales agents, so that switching advice is given in members' interest and not for commercial gain. Fifth, concentrate issuance in government securities, to create more liquid instruments. And sixth, conduct further research on the concept of a central liquidity pool to manage unexpected outflows.
format Working Paper
topic_facet REGULATION
PENSION FUNDS
INVESTMENT
PORTFOLIO
ACCOUNTABILITY
LIQUIDITY
author Pedraza Morales, Alvaro Enrique
Fuentes, Olga
Searle, Pamela
Stewart, Fiona
author_facet Pedraza Morales, Alvaro Enrique
Fuentes, Olga
Searle, Pamela
Stewart, Fiona
author_sort Pedraza Morales, Alvaro Enrique
title Pension Funds and the Impact of Switching Regulation on Long-Term Investment
title_short Pension Funds and the Impact of Switching Regulation on Long-Term Investment
title_full Pension Funds and the Impact of Switching Regulation on Long-Term Investment
title_fullStr Pension Funds and the Impact of Switching Regulation on Long-Term Investment
title_full_unstemmed Pension Funds and the Impact of Switching Regulation on Long-Term Investment
title_sort pension funds and the impact of switching regulation on long-term investment
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2017-07
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/289981499787589121/Pension-funds-and-the-impact-of-switching-regulation-on-long-term-investment
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/27646
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AT fuentesolga pensionfundsandtheimpactofswitchingregulationonlongterminvestment
AT searlepamela pensionfundsandtheimpactofswitchingregulationonlongterminvestment
AT stewartfiona pensionfundsandtheimpactofswitchingregulationonlongterminvestment
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