Uncertainty as a Factor in Investment Decisions

This paper argues that although the bulk of the literature tends to focus on regulatory uncertainty stemming from formal practices, uncertainty that comes from unpredictable informal practices surrounding regulation is an underexplored additional form of regulatory uncertainty. The paper uses the results of empirical analysis of several unique firm-level data sets to argue that firms in Russian institutional environments adapt to informal practices of business-government interactions, so long as these practices are predictable. The paper draws a distinction between differences in levels of relatively well-ordered (and often centralized) and therefore predictable corruption—a predictable component of the cost of doing business—and variation in experiences with corruption, which often results from decentralized, unconstrained ("administrative") corruption and the rent-seeking incentives of lower level officials. It argues that a significant obstacle to investment decisions at the regional level is not so much formal or informal rules per se, but lack of predictability of their application. It also examines in-country inconsistency in property rights enforcement as another source of underexplored regulatory uncertainty tied to informal practice. Unlike administrative corruption, inconsistent property rights enforcement is a fundamental, existential threat to businesses. To test this hypothesis, the paper draws on a measure that captures private "raiders'" attacks on firms—hostile, often violent takeovers of firms by outsiders aided and often abetted by law enforcement agencies. The paper argues that the greater is the number of raider attacks for a given region, the greater is the uncertainty and the less likely is investment.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Levina, Irina A., Kisunko, Gregory V., Marques, Israel I., Yakovlev, Andrei A.
Format: Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2016-08
Subjects:BEEPS, corruption, investment, property rights, regulatory burden, uncertainty, rights enforcement, legal institutions,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/08/26739542/uncertainty-factor-investment-decisions-case-russian-federations-regions
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/25051
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spelling dig-okr-10986250512024-08-07T19:51:43Z Uncertainty as a Factor in Investment Decisions The Case of the Russian Federation's Regions Levina, Irina A. Kisunko, Gregory V. Marques, Israel I. Yakovlev, Andrei A. BEEPS corruption investment property rights regulatory burden uncertainty rights enforcement legal institutions This paper argues that although the bulk of the literature tends to focus on regulatory uncertainty stemming from formal practices, uncertainty that comes from unpredictable informal practices surrounding regulation is an underexplored additional form of regulatory uncertainty. The paper uses the results of empirical analysis of several unique firm-level data sets to argue that firms in Russian institutional environments adapt to informal practices of business-government interactions, so long as these practices are predictable. The paper draws a distinction between differences in levels of relatively well-ordered (and often centralized) and therefore predictable corruption—a predictable component of the cost of doing business—and variation in experiences with corruption, which often results from decentralized, unconstrained ("administrative") corruption and the rent-seeking incentives of lower level officials. It argues that a significant obstacle to investment decisions at the regional level is not so much formal or informal rules per se, but lack of predictability of their application. It also examines in-country inconsistency in property rights enforcement as another source of underexplored regulatory uncertainty tied to informal practice. Unlike administrative corruption, inconsistent property rights enforcement is a fundamental, existential threat to businesses. To test this hypothesis, the paper draws on a measure that captures private "raiders'" attacks on firms—hostile, often violent takeovers of firms by outsiders aided and often abetted by law enforcement agencies. The paper argues that the greater is the number of raider attacks for a given region, the greater is the uncertainty and the less likely is investment. 2016-09-12T22:26:31Z 2016-09-12T22:26:31Z 2016-08 Working Paper Document de travail Documento de trabajo http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/08/26739542/uncertainty-factor-investment-decisions-case-russian-federations-regions https://hdl.handle.net/10986/25051 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7806 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language English
en_US
topic BEEPS
corruption
investment
property rights
regulatory burden
uncertainty
rights enforcement
legal institutions
BEEPS
corruption
investment
property rights
regulatory burden
uncertainty
rights enforcement
legal institutions
spellingShingle BEEPS
corruption
investment
property rights
regulatory burden
uncertainty
rights enforcement
legal institutions
BEEPS
corruption
investment
property rights
regulatory burden
uncertainty
rights enforcement
legal institutions
Levina, Irina A.
Kisunko, Gregory V.
Marques, Israel I.
Yakovlev, Andrei A.
Uncertainty as a Factor in Investment Decisions
description This paper argues that although the bulk of the literature tends to focus on regulatory uncertainty stemming from formal practices, uncertainty that comes from unpredictable informal practices surrounding regulation is an underexplored additional form of regulatory uncertainty. The paper uses the results of empirical analysis of several unique firm-level data sets to argue that firms in Russian institutional environments adapt to informal practices of business-government interactions, so long as these practices are predictable. The paper draws a distinction between differences in levels of relatively well-ordered (and often centralized) and therefore predictable corruption—a predictable component of the cost of doing business—and variation in experiences with corruption, which often results from decentralized, unconstrained ("administrative") corruption and the rent-seeking incentives of lower level officials. It argues that a significant obstacle to investment decisions at the regional level is not so much formal or informal rules per se, but lack of predictability of their application. It also examines in-country inconsistency in property rights enforcement as another source of underexplored regulatory uncertainty tied to informal practice. Unlike administrative corruption, inconsistent property rights enforcement is a fundamental, existential threat to businesses. To test this hypothesis, the paper draws on a measure that captures private "raiders'" attacks on firms—hostile, often violent takeovers of firms by outsiders aided and often abetted by law enforcement agencies. The paper argues that the greater is the number of raider attacks for a given region, the greater is the uncertainty and the less likely is investment.
format Working Paper
topic_facet BEEPS
corruption
investment
property rights
regulatory burden
uncertainty
rights enforcement
legal institutions
author Levina, Irina A.
Kisunko, Gregory V.
Marques, Israel I.
Yakovlev, Andrei A.
author_facet Levina, Irina A.
Kisunko, Gregory V.
Marques, Israel I.
Yakovlev, Andrei A.
author_sort Levina, Irina A.
title Uncertainty as a Factor in Investment Decisions
title_short Uncertainty as a Factor in Investment Decisions
title_full Uncertainty as a Factor in Investment Decisions
title_fullStr Uncertainty as a Factor in Investment Decisions
title_full_unstemmed Uncertainty as a Factor in Investment Decisions
title_sort uncertainty as a factor in investment decisions
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2016-08
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/08/26739542/uncertainty-factor-investment-decisions-case-russian-federations-regions
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/25051
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