Public versus Private Ownership : The Current State of the Debate
At the heart of the debate about public versus private ownership lie three questions: 1) Does competition matter more than ownership? 2) Are state enterprises more subject to welfare-reducing interventions by government than private firms are? 3) Do state enterprises suffer more from governance problems than private firms do? Even if the answers to these questions favor private ownership, the question must still be asked: Do distortions in the process of privatization mean that privatized firms perform worse than state enterprises? The author's review found greater ambiguity about the merits of privatization and private ownership in the theoretical literature than in the empirical literature. In most cases, empirical research strongly favors private ownership in competitive markets over a state-owned counterfactual (although construction of the counterfactual is itself a problem). Theory's ambiguity about ownership in monopoly markets seems better justified. Since the choice confronting governments is between state ownership and privatization rather than between privatization and optimality, theory has left a gap that empirical work has tried to fill. Further research is needed.
Saved in:
| id |
dig-okr-1098619806 |
|---|---|
| record_format |
koha |
| spelling |
dig-okr-10986198062024-08-08T18:07:24Z Public versus Private Ownership : The Current State of the Debate Shirley, Mary Walsh, Patrick ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BIDDING CENTRAL PLANNING COLLUSION COMMON GOOD COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMER CHOICE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COST SAVINGS DEMOCRACIES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DUOPOLY ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS HOSTILE TAKEOVER INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INDUSTRIALIZATION INEFFICIENCY INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MANAGERIAL SLACK MARGINAL COST MARKET COMPETITION MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET LIBERALIZATION MARKET SHARE MARKET STRUCTURE MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY NATURAL MONOPOLIES NATURAL MONOPOLY POLICY RESEARCH POSITIVE EFFECTS PRESENT VALUE PRICE CONTROLS PRICE INCREASES PRICES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCT QUALITY PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PRODUCTIVE ASSETS PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS REGULATORY CAPTURE SALES SCALE ECONOMIES SOCIAL WELFARE SUPPLIERS SURPLUSES TAKEOVER TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS TRANSITION ECONOMIES At the heart of the debate about public versus private ownership lie three questions: 1) Does competition matter more than ownership? 2) Are state enterprises more subject to welfare-reducing interventions by government than private firms are? 3) Do state enterprises suffer more from governance problems than private firms do? Even if the answers to these questions favor private ownership, the question must still be asked: Do distortions in the process of privatization mean that privatized firms perform worse than state enterprises? The author's review found greater ambiguity about the merits of privatization and private ownership in the theoretical literature than in the empirical literature. In most cases, empirical research strongly favors private ownership in competitive markets over a state-owned counterfactual (although construction of the counterfactual is itself a problem). Theory's ambiguity about ownership in monopoly markets seems better justified. Since the choice confronting governments is between state ownership and privatization rather than between privatization and optimality, theory has left a gap that empirical work has tried to fill. Further research is needed. 2014-08-28T14:52:17Z 2014-08-28T14:52:17Z 2000-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/08/693336/public-versus-private-ownership-current-state-debate https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19806 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2420 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
| collection |
DSpace |
| country |
Estados Unidos |
| countrycode |
US |
| component |
Bibliográfico |
| access |
En linea |
| databasecode |
dig-okr |
| tag |
biblioteca |
| region |
America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BIDDING CENTRAL PLANNING COLLUSION COMMON GOOD COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMER CHOICE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COST SAVINGS DEMOCRACIES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DUOPOLY ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS HOSTILE TAKEOVER INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INDUSTRIALIZATION INEFFICIENCY INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MANAGERIAL SLACK MARGINAL COST MARKET COMPETITION MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET LIBERALIZATION MARKET SHARE MARKET STRUCTURE MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY NATURAL MONOPOLIES NATURAL MONOPOLY POLICY RESEARCH POSITIVE EFFECTS PRESENT VALUE PRICE CONTROLS PRICE INCREASES PRICES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCT QUALITY PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PRODUCTIVE ASSETS PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS REGULATORY CAPTURE SALES SCALE ECONOMIES SOCIAL WELFARE SUPPLIERS SURPLUSES TAKEOVER TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS TRANSITION ECONOMIES ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BIDDING CENTRAL PLANNING COLLUSION COMMON GOOD COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMER CHOICE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COST SAVINGS DEMOCRACIES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DUOPOLY ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS HOSTILE TAKEOVER INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INDUSTRIALIZATION INEFFICIENCY INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MANAGERIAL SLACK MARGINAL COST MARKET COMPETITION MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET LIBERALIZATION MARKET SHARE MARKET STRUCTURE MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY NATURAL MONOPOLIES NATURAL MONOPOLY POLICY RESEARCH POSITIVE EFFECTS PRESENT VALUE PRICE CONTROLS PRICE INCREASES PRICES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCT QUALITY PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PRODUCTIVE ASSETS PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS REGULATORY CAPTURE SALES SCALE ECONOMIES SOCIAL WELFARE SUPPLIERS SURPLUSES TAKEOVER TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS TRANSITION ECONOMIES |
| spellingShingle |
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BIDDING CENTRAL PLANNING COLLUSION COMMON GOOD COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMER CHOICE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COST SAVINGS DEMOCRACIES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DUOPOLY ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS HOSTILE TAKEOVER INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INDUSTRIALIZATION INEFFICIENCY INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MANAGERIAL SLACK MARGINAL COST MARKET COMPETITION MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET LIBERALIZATION MARKET SHARE MARKET STRUCTURE MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY NATURAL MONOPOLIES NATURAL MONOPOLY POLICY RESEARCH POSITIVE EFFECTS PRESENT VALUE PRICE CONTROLS PRICE INCREASES PRICES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCT QUALITY PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PRODUCTIVE ASSETS PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS REGULATORY CAPTURE SALES SCALE ECONOMIES SOCIAL WELFARE SUPPLIERS SURPLUSES TAKEOVER TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS TRANSITION ECONOMIES ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BIDDING CENTRAL PLANNING COLLUSION COMMON GOOD COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMER CHOICE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COST SAVINGS DEMOCRACIES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DUOPOLY ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS HOSTILE TAKEOVER INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INDUSTRIALIZATION INEFFICIENCY INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MANAGERIAL SLACK MARGINAL COST MARKET COMPETITION MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET LIBERALIZATION MARKET SHARE MARKET STRUCTURE MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY NATURAL MONOPOLIES NATURAL MONOPOLY POLICY RESEARCH POSITIVE EFFECTS PRESENT VALUE PRICE CONTROLS PRICE INCREASES PRICES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCT QUALITY PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PRODUCTIVE ASSETS PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS REGULATORY CAPTURE SALES SCALE ECONOMIES SOCIAL WELFARE SUPPLIERS SURPLUSES TAKEOVER TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS TRANSITION ECONOMIES Shirley, Mary Walsh, Patrick Public versus Private Ownership : The Current State of the Debate |
| description |
At the heart of the debate about public
versus private ownership lie three questions: 1) Does
competition matter more than ownership? 2) Are state
enterprises more subject to welfare-reducing interventions
by government than private firms are? 3) Do state
enterprises suffer more from governance problems than
private firms do? Even if the answers to these questions
favor private ownership, the question must still be asked:
Do distortions in the process of privatization mean that
privatized firms perform worse than state enterprises? The
author's review found greater ambiguity about the
merits of privatization and private ownership in the
theoretical literature than in the empirical literature. In
most cases, empirical research strongly favors private
ownership in competitive markets over a state-owned
counterfactual (although construction of the counterfactual
is itself a problem). Theory's ambiguity about
ownership in monopoly markets seems better justified. Since
the choice confronting governments is between state
ownership and privatization rather than between
privatization and optimality, theory has left a gap that
empirical work has tried to fill. Further research is needed. |
| topic_facet |
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANKRUPTCY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BIDDING CENTRAL PLANNING COLLUSION COMMON GOOD COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMER CHOICE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COST SAVINGS DEMOCRACIES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DUOPOLY ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXTERNALITIES FIXED COSTS HOSTILE TAKEOVER INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCENTIVE SYSTEMS INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INCREASING RETURNS INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE INDUSTRIALIZATION INEFFICIENCY INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES MACROECONOMIC POLICY MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MANAGERIAL SLACK MARGINAL COST MARKET COMPETITION MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET LIBERALIZATION MARKET SHARE MARKET STRUCTURE MONOPOLIES MONOPOLY NATURAL MONOPOLIES NATURAL MONOPOLY POLICY RESEARCH POSITIVE EFFECTS PRESENT VALUE PRICE CONTROLS PRICE INCREASES PRICES PRIVATE INFORMATION PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCERS PRODUCT MARKETS PRODUCT QUALITY PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PRODUCTIVE ASSETS PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOODS REGULATORY CAPTURE SALES SCALE ECONOMIES SOCIAL WELFARE SUPPLIERS SURPLUSES TAKEOVER TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADEOFFS TRANSITION ECONOMIES |
| author |
Shirley, Mary Walsh, Patrick |
| author_facet |
Shirley, Mary Walsh, Patrick |
| author_sort |
Shirley, Mary |
| title |
Public versus Private Ownership : The Current State of the Debate |
| title_short |
Public versus Private Ownership : The Current State of the Debate |
| title_full |
Public versus Private Ownership : The Current State of the Debate |
| title_fullStr |
Public versus Private Ownership : The Current State of the Debate |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Public versus Private Ownership : The Current State of the Debate |
| title_sort |
public versus private ownership : the current state of the debate |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2000-08 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/08/693336/public-versus-private-ownership-current-state-debate https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19806 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT shirleymary publicversusprivateownershipthecurrentstateofthedebate AT walshpatrick publicversusprivateownershipthecurrentstateofthedebate |
| _version_ |
1807157558839869440 |