On the Duration of Civil War

The authors model the duration of large-scale, violent civil conflicts, applying hazard functions to a comprehensive data set on such conflicts for the period 1960-99. They find that the duration of conflicts is determined by a substantially different set of variables than those that determine their initiation. The duration of conflict increases substantially if the society is composed of a few large ethnic groups, if there is extensive forest cover, and if the conflict has commenced since 1980. None of these factors affects the initiation of conflict. The authors also find that neither the duration nor the initiation of conflict is affected by initial inequality or political repression. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that rebellions are initiated where they are viable during conflict, regardless of the prospects of attaining post-conflict goals, and that they persist unless circumstances change.

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Main Authors: Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, Soderbom, Mans
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2001-09
Subjects:ARMAMENTS, CIVIL CONFLICT, CIVIL CONFLICTS, CIVIL WAR, CIVIL WAR DATA, CIVIL WARS, CONFLICT COUNTRIES, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CONFLICT RISK, CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, DEFENSE, DIASPORA, DIASPORA VARIABLE, DIASPORAS, DURATION OF WAR, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ETHNIC DIVERSITY, ETHNIC DOMINANCE, ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION, ETHNIC GROUP, ETHNIC GROUPS, ETHNIC HATREDS, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INSURRECTIONS, GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION, GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES, GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY, HAZARD FUNCTION, HAZARD MODEL, HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES, HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY, INCOME, INEQUALITY, INTERNATIONAL WAR, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MODEL OF CONFLICT, PEACE, PEACE RESEARCH, POLITICAL REPRESSION, POLITICAL SUPPORT, POOR, POST- CONFLICT, POST-CONFLICT, POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY, POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS, POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES, PROBABILITY OF WAR, REBEL ORGANIZATION, REBEL ORGANIZATIONS, REBEL VICTORY, REBELLION, REBELLIONS, REFUGEES, RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION, RISK OF CONFLICT, SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION, VIOLENT CONFLICT, WAR DURATION, WAR ECONOMIES, WAR PROJECT,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614731/duration-civil-war
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19534
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spelling dig-okr-10986195342024-08-08T18:00:12Z On the Duration of Civil War Collier, Paul Hoeffler, Anke Soderbom, Mans ARMAMENTS CIVIL CONFLICT CIVIL CONFLICTS CIVIL WAR CIVIL WAR DATA CIVIL WARS CONFLICT COUNTRIES CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFLICT RISK CRIMINAL ACTIVITY DEFENSE DIASPORA DIASPORA VARIABLE DIASPORAS DURATION OF WAR ECONOMIC GROWTH ETHNIC DIVERSITY ETHNIC DOMINANCE ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ETHNIC GROUP ETHNIC GROUPS ETHNIC HATREDS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INSURRECTIONS GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY HAZARD FUNCTION HAZARD MODEL HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY INCOME INEQUALITY INTERNATIONAL WAR JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION MILITARY EQUIPMENT MODEL OF CONFLICT PEACE PEACE RESEARCH POLITICAL REPRESSION POLITICAL SUPPORT POOR POST- CONFLICT POST-CONFLICT POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES PROBABILITY OF WAR REBEL ORGANIZATION REBEL ORGANIZATIONS REBEL VICTORY REBELLION REBELLIONS REFUGEES RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION RISK OF CONFLICT SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION VIOLENT CONFLICT WAR DURATION WAR ECONOMIES WAR PROJECT The authors model the duration of large-scale, violent civil conflicts, applying hazard functions to a comprehensive data set on such conflicts for the period 1960-99. They find that the duration of conflicts is determined by a substantially different set of variables than those that determine their initiation. The duration of conflict increases substantially if the society is composed of a few large ethnic groups, if there is extensive forest cover, and if the conflict has commenced since 1980. None of these factors affects the initiation of conflict. The authors also find that neither the duration nor the initiation of conflict is affected by initial inequality or political repression. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that rebellions are initiated where they are viable during conflict, regardless of the prospects of attaining post-conflict goals, and that they persist unless circumstances change. 2014-08-20T21:06:54Z 2014-08-20T21:06:54Z 2001-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614731/duration-civil-war https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19534 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2681 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language English
en_US
topic ARMAMENTS
CIVIL CONFLICT
CIVIL CONFLICTS
CIVIL WAR
CIVIL WAR DATA
CIVIL WARS
CONFLICT COUNTRIES
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
CONFLICT RISK
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
DEFENSE
DIASPORA
DIASPORA VARIABLE
DIASPORAS
DURATION OF WAR
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ETHNIC DIVERSITY
ETHNIC DOMINANCE
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION
ETHNIC GROUP
ETHNIC GROUPS
ETHNIC HATREDS
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INSURRECTIONS
GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION
GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY
HAZARD FUNCTION
HAZARD MODEL
HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES
HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY
INCOME
INEQUALITY
INTERNATIONAL WAR
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
MODEL OF CONFLICT
PEACE
PEACE RESEARCH
POLITICAL REPRESSION
POLITICAL SUPPORT
POOR
POST- CONFLICT
POST-CONFLICT
POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY
POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
PROBABILITY OF WAR
REBEL ORGANIZATION
REBEL ORGANIZATIONS
REBEL VICTORY
REBELLION
REBELLIONS
REFUGEES
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION
RISK OF CONFLICT
SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION
VIOLENT CONFLICT
WAR DURATION
WAR ECONOMIES
WAR PROJECT
ARMAMENTS
CIVIL CONFLICT
CIVIL CONFLICTS
CIVIL WAR
CIVIL WAR DATA
CIVIL WARS
CONFLICT COUNTRIES
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
CONFLICT RISK
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
DEFENSE
DIASPORA
DIASPORA VARIABLE
DIASPORAS
DURATION OF WAR
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ETHNIC DIVERSITY
ETHNIC DOMINANCE
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION
ETHNIC GROUP
ETHNIC GROUPS
ETHNIC HATREDS
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INSURRECTIONS
GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION
GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY
HAZARD FUNCTION
HAZARD MODEL
HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES
HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY
INCOME
INEQUALITY
INTERNATIONAL WAR
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
MODEL OF CONFLICT
PEACE
PEACE RESEARCH
POLITICAL REPRESSION
POLITICAL SUPPORT
POOR
POST- CONFLICT
POST-CONFLICT
POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY
POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
PROBABILITY OF WAR
REBEL ORGANIZATION
REBEL ORGANIZATIONS
REBEL VICTORY
REBELLION
REBELLIONS
REFUGEES
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION
RISK OF CONFLICT
SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION
VIOLENT CONFLICT
WAR DURATION
WAR ECONOMIES
WAR PROJECT
spellingShingle ARMAMENTS
CIVIL CONFLICT
CIVIL CONFLICTS
CIVIL WAR
CIVIL WAR DATA
CIVIL WARS
CONFLICT COUNTRIES
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
CONFLICT RISK
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
DEFENSE
DIASPORA
DIASPORA VARIABLE
DIASPORAS
DURATION OF WAR
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ETHNIC DIVERSITY
ETHNIC DOMINANCE
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION
ETHNIC GROUP
ETHNIC GROUPS
ETHNIC HATREDS
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INSURRECTIONS
GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION
GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY
HAZARD FUNCTION
HAZARD MODEL
HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES
HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY
INCOME
INEQUALITY
INTERNATIONAL WAR
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
MODEL OF CONFLICT
PEACE
PEACE RESEARCH
POLITICAL REPRESSION
POLITICAL SUPPORT
POOR
POST- CONFLICT
POST-CONFLICT
POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY
POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
PROBABILITY OF WAR
REBEL ORGANIZATION
REBEL ORGANIZATIONS
REBEL VICTORY
REBELLION
REBELLIONS
REFUGEES
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION
RISK OF CONFLICT
SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION
VIOLENT CONFLICT
WAR DURATION
WAR ECONOMIES
WAR PROJECT
ARMAMENTS
CIVIL CONFLICT
CIVIL CONFLICTS
CIVIL WAR
CIVIL WAR DATA
CIVIL WARS
CONFLICT COUNTRIES
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
CONFLICT RISK
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
DEFENSE
DIASPORA
DIASPORA VARIABLE
DIASPORAS
DURATION OF WAR
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ETHNIC DIVERSITY
ETHNIC DOMINANCE
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION
ETHNIC GROUP
ETHNIC GROUPS
ETHNIC HATREDS
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INSURRECTIONS
GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION
GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY
HAZARD FUNCTION
HAZARD MODEL
HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES
HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY
INCOME
INEQUALITY
INTERNATIONAL WAR
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
MODEL OF CONFLICT
PEACE
PEACE RESEARCH
POLITICAL REPRESSION
POLITICAL SUPPORT
POOR
POST- CONFLICT
POST-CONFLICT
POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY
POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
PROBABILITY OF WAR
REBEL ORGANIZATION
REBEL ORGANIZATIONS
REBEL VICTORY
REBELLION
REBELLIONS
REFUGEES
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION
RISK OF CONFLICT
SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION
VIOLENT CONFLICT
WAR DURATION
WAR ECONOMIES
WAR PROJECT
Collier, Paul
Hoeffler, Anke
Soderbom, Mans
On the Duration of Civil War
description The authors model the duration of large-scale, violent civil conflicts, applying hazard functions to a comprehensive data set on such conflicts for the period 1960-99. They find that the duration of conflicts is determined by a substantially different set of variables than those that determine their initiation. The duration of conflict increases substantially if the society is composed of a few large ethnic groups, if there is extensive forest cover, and if the conflict has commenced since 1980. None of these factors affects the initiation of conflict. The authors also find that neither the duration nor the initiation of conflict is affected by initial inequality or political repression. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that rebellions are initiated where they are viable during conflict, regardless of the prospects of attaining post-conflict goals, and that they persist unless circumstances change.
topic_facet ARMAMENTS
CIVIL CONFLICT
CIVIL CONFLICTS
CIVIL WAR
CIVIL WAR DATA
CIVIL WARS
CONFLICT COUNTRIES
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
CONFLICT RISK
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
DEFENSE
DIASPORA
DIASPORA VARIABLE
DIASPORAS
DURATION OF WAR
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ETHNIC DIVERSITY
ETHNIC DOMINANCE
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION
ETHNIC GROUP
ETHNIC GROUPS
ETHNIC HATREDS
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INSURRECTIONS
GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION
GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY
HAZARD FUNCTION
HAZARD MODEL
HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES
HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY
INCOME
INEQUALITY
INTERNATIONAL WAR
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
MODEL OF CONFLICT
PEACE
PEACE RESEARCH
POLITICAL REPRESSION
POLITICAL SUPPORT
POOR
POST- CONFLICT
POST-CONFLICT
POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY
POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
PROBABILITY OF WAR
REBEL ORGANIZATION
REBEL ORGANIZATIONS
REBEL VICTORY
REBELLION
REBELLIONS
REFUGEES
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION
RISK OF CONFLICT
SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION
VIOLENT CONFLICT
WAR DURATION
WAR ECONOMIES
WAR PROJECT
author Collier, Paul
Hoeffler, Anke
Soderbom, Mans
author_facet Collier, Paul
Hoeffler, Anke
Soderbom, Mans
author_sort Collier, Paul
title On the Duration of Civil War
title_short On the Duration of Civil War
title_full On the Duration of Civil War
title_fullStr On the Duration of Civil War
title_full_unstemmed On the Duration of Civil War
title_sort on the duration of civil war
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2001-09
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/09/1614731/duration-civil-war
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19534
work_keys_str_mv AT collierpaul onthedurationofcivilwar
AT hoeffleranke onthedurationofcivilwar
AT soderbommans onthedurationofcivilwar
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