Regulatory Lessons from Argentina's Power Concessions
In the early 1990s, Argentina vertically separated and privatized most of its electricity industry. Transmission and distribution, considered natural monopolies, were sold by concession. The main objectives of the reforms were efficient pricing and production levels in the short term and enough investment to meet demand over the longer term. The authors look at the design of the regulatory features of the concession contracts and discuss the implications for long-term investment in the power sector.
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
1996-09
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| Subjects: | AVERAGE PRICES, CPI, FORECASTS, FREE RIDERS, INDEXATION, MARGINAL COST, MARGINAL COST PRICING, MARGINAL COSTS, NATURAL MONOPOLY, PRICE INDEX, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC HEARINGS, QUALITY STANDARDS, SPOT PRICE, SPOT PRICES, SUNK COSTS, WARRANTS, WILLINGNESS TO PAY DENATIONALIZATION, CONCESSIONS, INVESTMENTS, INDUSTRY, ELECTRICITY, POWER GENERATION, MONOPOLIES, REGULATIONS, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/09/693097/regulatory-lessons-argentinas-power-concessions https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11609 |
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